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The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC #05284-84 13 September 1984

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

14 SEP 1984

FROM:

National Intelligence Officer for USSR

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SUBJECT:

Late Items on Gromyko Visit

Because tomorrow's 0945 meeting on the Gromyko visit is likely to be pressed, I want you to have some pertinent items of information that have come in today for prior perusal.

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Soviet embassy First Secretary Domakhin recently told that "some positive sign", like delay of the ASAT tests, would help. As you may now know, our tests have, in fact, been delayed, the first one until after Gromyko's visit, the second until after the elections, for political reasons. Although it is not supposed to, this information is getting around. The Soviets are likely to pick it up, but I have no knowledge they have done so yet.

Pravda 5 September had strong editorial language on the sanctity of Soviet welfare goals, despite the tense international environment, citing Chernenko. FBIS believes this may reveal a resource allocation decision that contributed to Ogarkov's fall. I believe there is a resource debate, as always, and a current political need to reassure Soviet consumers. But I doubt long-term resource decisions (e.g., next 5 year plan) have been nailed down or that Ogarkov was actually removed over them.

Rick Burt's three principal deputies on Soviet affairs and Undersecretary Armacost's Soviet assistant are all unable at this time to specify exactly when the invitation to Gromyko was tendered and accepted. This has been held very close to the vest. But the timing details are, I believe, important to our analysis of Soviet plans.

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